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Abstract:  
 
I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: 
the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic 
phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within 
the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. 
 
1. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit 
 
 In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem 
of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Here 
I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. 
 The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers all have 
something in common. First, one notices that the puzzling character of consciousness is grasped 
through introspection. Then, one tries to understand why we should expect introspection – the 
representation, by a cognitive system, of its own mental states – to generate problem intuitions. 
Maybe we should expect introspective mechanisms to represent mental states as instantiations 
of primitive properties (Chalmers, 2018, p. 25) and/or as instantiations of primitive relations to 
properties (Chalmers, 2018, p. 27), and/or as states about which we have immediate (i.e. non 
inferentially mediated) knowledge (Chalmers, 2018, p. 23). 
                                                          
1 Thanks to David Chalmers, Keith Frankish and Wolfgang Schwarz for their useful comments, and to Sonia Paz-
Higgins for her help. 
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These solutions all encounter a problem, mixing what Chalmers calls the “resistance 
problem” (similar to what I called the “illusion meta-problem” earlier (Kammerer, 2018)) and 
what he calls the “belief problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 25, 27). For most representations 
(including representations of primitive properties and relations, or representations providing 
immediate knowledge), we can easily contemplate that the represented entities could appear to 
us to be a certain way and yet still be different. I can represent that there is a white object in 
spatial contact with a red object in front of me (primitive properties, primitive relation), or that 
my name is François (immediate knowledge), or that I hope that no one will wish me a happy 
birthday (immediate knowledge). However, I can also easily represent to myself how all of that 
could appear to me to be the case without being the case. I could be hallucinating colored 
objects, dreaming that my name is François (while in fact it really is Jean-Pierre), or I could be 
self-blind and hiding from myself the fact that I actually long for birthday wishes. In 
comparison, phenomenal experiences stand out. I do not think things could appear to me as if 
I had an experience (say) of a red object without really having such an experience. If an 
experience appears to me, I have it. 
Following Chalmers, we might explain this by the fact that we have a sense of 
acquaintance with experiences but not with other things. We take experiences to be directly and 
concretely presented to us, in a way that reveals them – while we do not think the same of 
colored objects, hopes and first names. The exact nature of this sense of acquaintance might be 
hard to pin down, but one can start by noticing that this sense of acquaintance is more than a 
mere sense of immediate knowledge: we think we know immediately (without inferential 
mediation) our own names, our (standing) hopes and beliefs, etc., but not that we are acquainted 
with these things. Indeed, only experiences seem concretely presented and revealed. Crucially, 
this sense of acquaintance is also different from a mere sense of certainty (at least in standard 
senses of “certainty”): arguably, I am certain that (P&Q) P or that 2+2=4, but the 
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corresponding entities do not seem to be concretely presented (“right there”) to me in the same 
way. 
Our sense of acquaintance with experiences might explain why we think that they never 
appear other than they are. However, appealing to our sense of acquaintance describes the 
problem rather than solving it. Indeed, that we have such a sense of acquaintance stands itself 
in need of an explanation – at least on two levels. First, there is the mechanism question: what 
kind of mechanism generates our sense of acquaintance with our experiences? Second, the 
design question: why does phenomenal introspection (and only phenomenal introspection) rely 
on a similar mechanism? The “limitative” part of the question is important: we introspect some 
mental states (hopes, beliefs, etc.) with a mechanism that does not generate any sense of 
acquaintance. Why on earth is phenomenal introspection not just like belief introspection? 
If we want to explain our sense of acquaintance, introspection, narrowly understood, is a 
red-herring – the wrong starting point. Instead of asking what we should expect of a cognitive 
system representing its own internal mental states, I suggest that we ask what we should expect 
from a cognitive system representing some mental states as grounding its (or other’s) evidential 
situation. This is the evidential approach: trying to explain problem intuitions by understanding 
our grasp of consciousness within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive 
of evidential situations.2 
Why follow the evidential approach, on the face of it? As I said, our sense of acquaintance 
is not a mere sense of immediate knowledge, nor a mere sense of certainty. It is the sense that 
experiences are always presented to the experiencer in a peculiar way, which reveals them. But 
the concepts of presentation and revelation used to articulate our sense of acquaintance are 
arguably epistemological, evidential concepts. Something is presented to us when it appears to 
us, or is cognitively given to us – it features in the evidence we have at our disposal regarding 
                                                          
2 The approach called “Immediate Knowledge” is, in Chalmers’ list, the one that is closest to this approach – 
although their starting points are different (introspective representations vs representations of evidence). 
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reality, it is part of our data. Something is revealed to us when all of it appears to us – when its 
whole nature is systematically part of our data. It therefore seems natural, to understand our 
sense of acquaintance – this peculiar evidential status we give to experiences – to investigate 
the relation between the way we grasp experiences and the way we intuitively represent 
evidence, or data. The idea is that these two grasps might be intertwined in a way that explains 
our sense of acquaintance. 
 
2. Evidential systems 
 
The evidential approach, broadly understood, has been followed in various ways 
(Kammerer, 2016b, 2016a, 2019; Schwarz, 2018; Sturgeon, 1994) and might also be indirectly 
suggested by Chalmers himself when he stresses the importance of our sense of acquaintance 
(p. 25, p. 39). Here I would like to present one version of it. 
First, I ask: what should we reasonably expect of a sophisticated enough cognitive 
system? Answer: we should expect such a system to represent evidential situations, using a 
representational mechanism which satisfies certain constraints (and notably represents a class 
of evidential states as independent from beliefs and self-presenting). This gives a partial answer 
to the design question. Second, I ask: what mechanism do we use to represent this class of 
evidential states? I speculatively suggest an evolutionarily plausible mechanism, which does 
the job, but also generates a sense of acquaintance (as well as other problem intuitions) with 
the states it represents. This gives a speculative answer to the mechanism question. Together, 
these considerations constitute an attempt at solving the meta-problem of consciousness by 
following the evidential approach. 
Let us start with the point of view of design. 
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A. We should expect sophisticated enough cognitive systems to be evidential 
systems. Imagine a sophisticated cognitive system, with access to the world (sensory 
subsystems, behaving more or less like modules), cognitive states (beliefs, etc.), motivational 
states (desires, etc.), and meta-cognitive representations. Arguably, its meta-cognitive 
representational repertoire should not only feature representations of cognitive states and 
motivational states, but also of evidential states. It would represent some mental states as 
constituting the evidential basis for some propositions (“I am/it is in mental state X, in virtue 
of which I have/it has evidence for proposition P”). Let us call a system able to do this an 
evidential system. Here I understand evidence as follows: (a) having evidence for P gives a 
reason to believe that P; (b) knowing the total evidence possessed by a system is necessary (and 
arguably sufficient) to know what it should believe (and, if one assumes rationality, what it will 
believe). Note on the side: sometimes I will talk of evidence for beliefs, or for states of affairs, 
which is just a quick and rough way to say: evidence for a proposition which is the complement 
of a belief, or for a proposition made true by a given state of affairs. 
Why should we expect sophisticated cognitive systems to be evidential systems? 
Because an ability to represent evidential situations (on top of a mere ability to represent 
cognitive and motivational states) allows for the following. (1) A more flexible and reflective 
process of belief fixation (improving answers to questions such as “What to believe now?”) (2) 
Sharing evidence with others, leading to better epistemic cooperation (“I have evidence for P” 
– which is not the same as “I believe that P”). (3) Rational assessment of the beliefs of others 
(“Given their evidence, they should believe that P”). (4) Conditional predictions of others’ 
beliefs (“Given their evidence, if they are rational, they will believe that P”). 
B. We should expect evidential systems to differently represent evidence that 
depends on beliefs, and evidence that holds independently of beliefs (“passive evidence”). 
One thing that an evidential system could do is represent that evidence for a belief B is provided 
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by a knowledge of a fact F, partially constituted by an underlying belief B’; evidence for B’ is 
then represented as partially constituted by an underlying belief B’’, etc. Some beliefs could be 
represented as having no further support. There is no particular reason to think that the 
representation of such unsupported beliefs should create any difficulty. In my own case, I 
arguably represent my beliefs that I hope no one wishes me a happy birthday or that my name 
is François in this way. These are unsupported beliefs: beliefs for which I do not have further 
justification – which I just happen to have and to maintain. 
Our system also has access to the world through sensory subsystems. Arguably, the 
output of these systems (sensory judgments, constituted by sensory representations, which, we 
can suppose so here, represent the instantiation of sensible properties, characterized as primitive 
and basic qualities of objects) is robust, and relatively independent of the states which are under 
the direct control of the system (typically, beliefs and intentions). In a fodorian vocabulary, these 
subsystems behave like modules (this is also the case of other systems dedicated to memory, 
language comprehension, form recognition – but I will  set these aside for now and focus 
entirely on sensory systems). Moreover, the output of these subsystems is the causal basis for 
many of the system’s beliefs.  
We should expect all of these real features of the system’s function to be at least 
schematically captured by the evidential system. Thus, aside from representing evidential 
relations amongst beliefs, the system should be able to track the output of sensory subsystems 
and represent this output as providing evidence to the system, independently of what its beliefs 
(and other states it controls) are. In the first-person case, the system can thus judge “Whatever 
I believe, decide, etc., I have evidence for P” (“P” corresponding to a sensory judgment, that 
we can express with sentences such as “There is a red thing in front of me”). Let us call such 
evidence, independent of the states controlled by the system, “passive evidence”. 
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C. We should expect evidential systems to represent passive evidential states as 
presenting (as providing evidence for other states) but also always at the same time as self-
presenting (as providing evidence for themselves). Consider a first-person belief about a given 
passive evidential state E (“I am in E”: for example, “I have evidence, independently of what I 
believe, in favor of there being a red thing in front of me”). How will an evidential system 
represent the evidential support for such a belief? There are four obvious possibilities: it could 
represent this belief (i) as supported by other beliefs; (ii) as an unsupported belief; (iii) as 
supported by another passive evidential state F; (iv) as supported by E itself. 
The third possibility requires the representation of potentially infinite and/or circular 
chains of passive evidential states, which seems uselessly cumbersome. The first two  
possibilities give rise to unstable self-ascriptions of passive evidential states: a system could 
believe that it has a piece of evidence for P independently of what it believes, but also believes 
that whether or not it should believe that it has such evidence depends on what it believes. This 
leads to the recognition of unstable situations: one sometimes think that one should believe that 
P but should also believe that one should not believe that P. 
The fourth possibility, by contrast, provides a simpler and more convenient way to 
represent the evidential support of first-person beliefs about passive evidential states. It is 
reasonable to expect an evidential system to use it. So, we should expect passive evidential 
states to be represented as self-presenting, in the precise sense that we should expect them to 
be represented as such that, whenever one is in such state, one has evidence for one’s being in 
such state. 
Chalmers makes a similar point when stating that introspective systems will tend to give 
a foundational role to directly introspected states, and see them as providing evidence for other 
things as well as for themselves (Chalmers, 2018, p. 24). But Chalmers thinks that these states 
are seen as self-presenting simply because the system needs stopping points in the chains of 
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justifications. I disagree: unsupported beliefs would be good stopping points too! The reason 
why passive evidential states must be seen as self-presenting comes from the need to have a 
coherent and stable conception of their passive nature. 
 So, from the point of view of design, we should expect a sophisticated cognitive system: 
(A) to be an evidential system; (B) to differently represent evidence that depends on beliefs and 
unsupported beliefs on the one hand, and passive evidence on the other hand; (C) to represent 
passive evidence as self-presenting (in the sense I gave to the expression). Caveat: (A-C) 
express what we should naturally expect, not what is necessary. There might be ways to build 
a sophisticated cognitive system (though maybe not an efficient one) without satisfying (A-C). 
 
3. The evidence-by-resemblance mechanism (ERM) 
 
A system satisfying (A-C) will not necessarily develop a full sense of acquaintance 
regarding its passive evidential states: self-presentation is not enough for acquaintance! 
However, I think that we humans are sophisticated cognitive systems, satisfying (A-C), and that 
the mechanism by which we represent passive evidential states (usually called “conscious 
experiences”) does generate a sense of acquaintance about them. There might have been other 
possible ways to satisfy (A-C), but evolution, in our case, came up with a certain mechanism, 
which generates this sense of acquaintance.3 
I call this mechanism “ERM”. It presupposes that we already are evidential systems, 
endowed with a concept of evidence (i.e. we already satisfy A). 
Evidence by Resemblance Mechanism (ERM):  
                                                          
3 This mechanism is the one I described in (Kammerer, 2016a, 2019). The one described in (Kammerer, 2016b) 
was more specific and its presentation somewhat ad hoc; its explanatory power is captured and extended by the 
new one. See (Kammerer, 2019, n. 23) for a comparison. 
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(i) ERM is an innate, modular mechanism. It forms and applies representations at a 
subpersonal, implicit level. These representations track (notably) the output of our 
sensory subsystems (there is no need to imagine a dedicated complex tracking 
mechanism, as ERM can directly “take up” the output of such subsystems, which is 
arguably already broadcasted in the system) 
(ii) These representations characterize their referents as passive – constitutively 
independent of internal states under the control of the system, such as beliefs and 
intentions (arguably, a matter of the functional relations of these representations with 
the representations of beliefs, intentions, etc.) 
(iii) These representations are composed by recruiting our sensory representations 
(representing sensible properties, characterized as primitive and basic qualities of 
objects), our concept of evidence, and a primitive and basic concept of resemblance. 
They represent their referents as states which resemble the external states of 
affairs represented by sensory representations4, and which provide evidence to 
the subject who has them in virtue of that resemblance, according to this rule: a 
passive state provides evidence for whatever state of affairs it maximally 
resembles. Maximal resemblance here means the following: a given passive state 
maximally resembles a state of affairs X if and only if (a) it resembles X; (b) it is, 
amongst all possible passive states of the subject, the one that resembles X the most.5 
 
An evidential system (satisfying A) using ERM represents passive evidential states in a way 
that distinguishes them from the evidence provided by beliefs (it satisfies B). Crucially, if we 
                                                          
4 Given that these representations have such content, and given that they track sensory states, one can say they 
characterize sensory states as resembling (in a specific way) the external states of affairs they detect. If (as I think) 
sensory states do not really thus resemble these states of affairs, this characterization is a mischaracterization. 
5 Given this conception of maximal resemblance, there is nothing logically problematic with one given passive 
state maximally resembling various different states at the same time. 
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consider the rule used by this system to determine the evidential power of its passive evidential 
states (see feature iii), we see that these states will be represented as always self-presenting. 
Indeed, any passive evidential state will naturally be represented as maximally resembling itself 
(it is arguably a constitutive rule of any concept of resemblance that all things perfectly 
resemble themselves), which means any passive evidential state will be represented as 
providing evidence for itself (on top of other things). So, a system using ERM represents passive 
evidential states as self-presenting (it satisfies C). 
ERM is a simple mechanism, following simple rules. The representations it recruits 
(representations of evidence, of resemblance, and sensory representations) are arguably 
representations that any complex cognitive system has. By following the rule of resemblance, 
it gives the output that is required from the point of view of design: passive evidential states are 
represented not only as presenting, but as self-presenting. That makes ERM a simple, 
evolutionarily plausible mechanism, which naturally satisfies C. It is therefore not entirely 
surprising that (as I speculate) evolution has gifted us with ERM to represent passive evidence. 
 
4. Solving the meta-problem 
 
Suppose we do use ERM. It represents (in a modular way) that we enter passive evidential 
states which provide evidence for certain external states of affairs (for the proposition ‘there is 
a red thing there’), as well as for themselves (for the proposition ‘I have passive evidence that 
there is a red thing there’). When seen as presenting other states, such states are also seen as 
capable of providing misleading evidence. We can be in a state that resembles a given state of 
affairs, for which we thereby have evidence, even if that state of affairs is not the case (e.g. if I 
am in a state resembling the presence of a red thing, although there is no red thing). But a crucial 
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by-product of the functioning of ERM is that it represents that it is impossible to have 
misleading evidence for our own passive evidential states. 
Indeed, what does ERM state about the evidence we have for our own passive evidential 
states? ERM cannot represent such evidence as dependent on beliefs (supported or 
unsupported), as this would create the kind of unstable self-ascriptions mentioned in 2.C. So, 
this evidence must be passive. But what happens when ERM represents that I have passive 
evidence for me being in passive evidential state E? ERM outputs that I am in a passive state 
which maximally resembles E – in a passive state that, amongst all possible passive states, is 
the one that resembles E the most. So, ERM outputs that I am in a state type-identical with E. 
Therefore, ERM represents that I cannot have misleading evidence for myself being in a passive 
evidential state of a certain kind, and that, more generally, a system’s passive evidential states 
must be exactly like what the system’s evidence for them presents them to be: ERM represents 
passive evidential states as revealed. Note that this only happens in the first-person: nothing 
prevents my evidence for your passive evidential states from not being passive, but from 
depending on my beliefs (as this does not lead to unstable ascriptions), which is why I easily 
accept that I can have misleading evidence about your passive evidential states. 
 Let us take stock. ERM represents passive evidential states as presenting the 
instantiation of sensible properties represented by sensory representations, as self-presenting, 
and as revealed. So, a system using ERM has a sense of acquaintance regarding its passive 
evidential states. The key to understand the generation of this sense of acquaintance is the use 
by ERM of the rule of maximal resemblance: this is a simple, rough rule, which gives the output 
required from the point of view of design (it generates a sense of presentation and self-
presentation). However, it has a crucial by-product (not explained at the level of design): it 
generates a sense of revelation. 
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Passive states are represented as resembling instantiations of sensible properties, 
represented by sensory representations. If, as I supposed earlier, our sensory representations 
characterize sensible properties as primitive qualities, physicalism regarding passive evidential 
states will be judged inacceptable – if one has a conception of the physical which excludes 
anything resembling a primitive quality. Of course, the system can always integrate the 
primitive qualities represented by sensory representations in the physical world, by judging that 
they are not really as they are presented to be (they are not really primitive, but complex 
physical properties). Crucially however, such a move is not available for passive evidential 
states – because they are represented as revealed. Therefore, a system using ERM will develop 
persistent and ineliminable primitivist and anti-physicalist intuitions about passive evidential 
states. It think it would also develop other problem intuitions. 
 I think that human phenomenal introspection uses ERM: our representations of 
phenomenal states are nothing but representations of passive evidential states. This explains, at 
the level of mechanism, why we have a sense of acquaintance regarding phenomenal states (thus 
solving the “resistance problem”), as well as other problem intuitions. Why we use ERM is not 
itself explained at the level of design; but it is nevertheless not entirely arbitrary, as ERM is an 
evolutionarily plausible mechanism that satisfies the design constraints that a sophisticated 
cognitive system is expected to satisfy. Moreover, this view explains, at the level of design, why 
we differently represent evidence depending on beliefs, and passive evidence. This solves the 
“belief problem” (i.e. explains why phenomenal introspection is not akin to belief introspection) 
at the level of design. 
My view, contrary to other views taking the evidential approach (Schwarz, 2018), does not 
predict that we will have absolute, unshakable certainty about experiences. Indeed, we do not; 
as some people (illusionists) deny that they really have experiences. What my view predicts as 
intuitively unacceptable is not that we can make mistakes about experiences, but that we can 
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make mistakes about experiences based on misleading evidence about them (at least when we 
use our innate, intuitive representation of evidence). The only mistakes about experiences we 
intuitively accept are mistakes made in spite of the available evidence – due to irrationality. We 
intuitively think that only systematically irrational persons – mad persons – can be 
systematically wrong about their experiences.6 This is why so many realists about 
consciousness jokingly suppose (wrongly) that illusionists must be zombies (the realist 
assuming here that they are themselves not zombies), lunatics – or insincere. 
The evidential approach is the best way to tackle the meta-problem. My own version 
hopefully gives an approximately correct solution to this problem. The hypothesis that we use 
ERM for phenomenal introspection is, of course, highly speculative. The evidential approach 
has been (and will be) pursued in different directions, leading to different hypotheses. I would 
very much like to see more such hypotheses developed in the future.7 
 The view I presented is silent on the existence of phenomenal states, but I recommend 
conjoining it with strong illusionism (Frankish, 2016): I think that it seems to us that we are in 
phenomenal states (in the sense that we tend to represent that we are in passive evidential states, 
which are self-presenting and revealed), but we are not. Such conjunction gives us an illusionist 
theory which explains why illusionism regarding consciousness is uniquely difficult to believe 
and to contemplate. Our deep sense of acquaintance prevents us from making intuitive sense of 
the idea that consciousness is an illusion, although this idea is coherent (and true) when 
formulated without our innate and intuitive concept of evidence. If this view is true, we should 
not be surprised if David Chalmers (and many others!) thinks that illusionism is obviously false 
and denies the most fundamental and immediate data we have. This kind of judgment is 
                                                          
6 This might be why Descartes, in the Meditations, rules out the madness hypothesis (“sed amentes sunt isti”) 
before the Cogito. 
7 For potential views similar to mine but which do not rely on resemblance, see (Kammerer, 2019, n. 24). 
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naturally explained when we understand the intertwining of our grasp of consciousness and of 
our representation of evidence – of the data. 
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